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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
September 29, 1986 Conference
Summer List 25, Sheet 2
No. 86-104
Bd. of Airport Comnnrs.,
et al. (want to stop First
Amendment activity)

v.
~o
~

Cert to CA9
(Sneed,
Anderson, Alarcon)

I'()\(

'Z

· Jews for Jesus, Inc., e
(pamphleteers)

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

Petrs argue CA9 erred in holding that the cen-

tral terminal area (CTA) at the Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX) is a traditional public forum.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Petrs are the Board of Air-

port Commissioners of

the City of

City of Los Angeles.

Pursuant to authority granted by the city

-

Los Angeles

(Board)

and

the

charter, the Board manages and controls all airports owned by the

-"city, including LAX.

On July 13, 1983, the Board adopt1ed a reso-

lution that prohibited First Amendment activ'
LAX. 1 On July

6,

1984,

resp Snyder,

ies

a member of

in ~he CTA of
resp Jews

for

Jesus, Inc., was distributing religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the CTA when he was asked to leave by a LAX peace
officer.

The

officer

informed

re sp of

the Board's

resolution

and told him that if he refused to leave, the city would initiate
legal action.

a

seeking

Resp left, and, a few days later, filed suit in de
declaration
The ~c

unconstituional.
the

~

the

that
(CD Cal,

Board's

Rafeedie,

tion was unconstitutional on its

J.)

resolution

was

determined that

The de held the resolu-

was a traditional public forum.

face and enjoined its enforce-

men ~

CA9 affirmed.
the

dispositive

forum.

The court noted that both parties agreed that

legal

The court

issue

rejected petr' s

Perry

Education Association

tion,

460

u.s.

37

was

(1983)

v.

whether

the

argument,

Perry

CTA

is

a

based on

Local Educators'

Associa-

and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense

BE
IT
FURTHER
RESOLVED
that
if
any
individual or entity engages in First Amendment
activities within the Central Terminal Area of
Los
Angeles
International Airport,
the City
Attorney ••• is directed to institute appropriate
litigation against such individual and/or entity

I

•,

public

which was

1 Resolution No. 13787 states, in relevant part:
"NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Board
of
Airport
Commissioners
that
the
Central
Terminal
Area
at
Los
Angeles
International
Airport
is
not
open
for
First
Amendment
activities by any individual and/or entity;

II

~

. c.-...1-....<- ~

'

&

Educational Fund,

Inc.,

105 s.ct.

3439

(1985), that the CTA was
I

nonpublic

because

petr

related purposes.

has

operated

LAX

~olely

fo d

airport-

,·~

Resps' reliance on Perry and Cornelius is mis-

placed.

Those cases concern whether governmental facilities that

are

traditional

not

public

Amendment activities.

forums

have

been

"those

places

which

fiat have been devoted
S.Ct., at 3349.

for

First

This case, by contrast, involves the sepa-

rate issue of whether LAX is a public forum,
one of

opened

by

long

ie. whether

it is

tradition or by government

to assembly and debate."

Cornelius, 10 5

If it is such a place, "restrictions such as an

absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be
upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental

interest."

United

States

v.

Grace,

461

u.s.

171,

177

(1983).
CA9 stated that 1 v..ery other circui!J that has addressed the
issue has concluded that airports are public forums.
Area Military Project

v.

City of Chicago,

cert. denied, 421 u.s. 992 (1975)
Southwest

Africa/Nambia

Trade

States, 708 F.2d 760 (CADC 1983)

that

the CTA is a

508 F.2d 921

(CA7),

(Chicago O'Hare); United States

& Cultural

Council

v.

United

v

(National and Dulles); Fernandes

v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (CA5 1981)
eluded

~ago

See

(Dallas-Fort Worth).

CA9 con-

traditional public forum and that the

Board's interest in limiting the uses of the terminal facilities
to

airport-related

justify

absolute

purposes

was

not

sufficiently compelling

prohibition of First Amendment

activity.

to
CA9

noted that the Board was free to impose reasonable time, place,

-q-

litera~ure

and manner restrictions on the distribution of

~

CTA.

'I
3.

on

in the

a

CONTENTIONS:

superficial

Petr argues that CA9 rested

analysis

of

current case

out-dated lower court decisions.

its decision

law and

reliance on

CA9 failed "to demonstrate the

existence of a traditional right of access respecting [interiors
of airport terminals]

for purposes of communication comparable to

that recognized for streets and parks
payers for Vincent,
the

airport

466

terminals

u.s.

789,

814

are not held

City Council v. Tax-

"

(1984).

in

trust

The interiors of
to be

used by the

public for assembly and debate, but rather are intended and dedicated
sion

to their airport-related purposes.
equates

the

CTA

with

traditional

But here,
public

CA9's deci-

forums

such

as

streets, parks, and sidewalks.
Petrs neither

intentionally nor

unintentionally opened

interiors of its terminals for public discourse.

the

CA9 has disre-

garded the government's right to use its property for its intended and dedicated purposes, and its decision compels every airport
operator to open its facilities as public forums restricted only
by

time,

place,

and

manner

regulations.

The cases

circuits relied upon by CA9 are inapposite.
address

whether

here--but
for

rather

an

airport

examined

was

time,

a

place,

airports that had opened their

tivities.

public

from other

Those cases did not
forum--the

and manner

key

issue

restrictions

facilities to expressive ac-

CA9 has concluded essentially that public ownership in

and of itself creates a public forum, and this conclusion is demonstrably wrong.

If CA9's decision

is allowed

to stand,

"all

government-operated facilities, regardless of their intended
purl
poses or dedication, may become mini-parks ~edicated ~t the widest range of activities imaginable."

Petn 16.

Resps contend that the cases relied upon by CA9 are clearly
apposite

and petrs'

argument

to the contrary

is erroneous.

In

United States Southwwest Africa/Nambia Trade & Cultural Council,
supra, the court explicitly stated that the public places at National and Dulles airports are "far more akin to such public forums as streets and common areas than they are to such nonforums
as prisons,

buses,

Fernandes,

supra,

and mi 1 i tary bases."
the court observed

7 0 8 F • 2d ,

that

at 7 6 4 •

In

it "is now generally

well established that airport terminals owned and administered by
governmental entities are public forums •••. "
And,

663 F.2d, at 626.

in Chicago Area Military Project, supra, the court held the

plaintiffs were

entitled

to

exercise First Amendment

rights

in

the terminal buildings, explaining that "the spacious, city-owned
common areas
been
the

long

•••

resembl~ .those public

recognized

exercise

of

thoroughfares which have

to be particularly appropriate places

constitutionally

protected

rights

"

for

508

F. 2d , at 9 2 5.
As to petrs argument that they have not opened the CTA for
public discourse, resps contend that a governmental entity cannot
create a public facility that has been traditionally held open to
the exercise of free speech and then close that forum simply by
intending that it have some other principal purpose.

In

Corne-

lius, supra, the Court observed that it looks "to the policy and
practice of

,...,

the government

to ascertain whether

it

intended

to

;

designate a place not traditionally open to assembly I and debate
as a

public

facts

forum."

105 s.ct.,

show that over

at 3449.

the past 10 years,

the ' ~tipulated
''j
resps have permitted a
Here,

variety of religious and political groups to distribute literature.
Resps argue that even assuming that the CTA is not a traditional public forum, any regulation of speech must be reasonable
and

not

supra.

an

effort

Petrs

to

fail

suppress

particular

to demonstrate

a

single

speech.
problem

See

Perry,

that might

result from the exercise of First Amendment activities.

The un-

disputed facts show that resp Snyder was not impeding the flow of
pedestrian traffic nor was he touching or harassing any per son.
Furthermore,

petrs

permit

commercial

speech

and

also

have

li-

censed the operation of a Christian Science reading room that is
open to the public.
tion of arguing

Petrs are therefore in the untenable posi-

in this case that the CTA should be limited to

ai rpor t-rela ted business while simultaneously they permit other
activities that are not so related.

Finally, the resolution is

clearly overbroad as it outlaws all "First Amendment activity."
4.

DISCUSSION:

CA9's opinion does not contain much "rea-

soned elaboration"

in

traditional

forum.

public

test articulated

support of its holding that the CTA is a
The

court

correctly

sets

forth

the

in Perry that such forums are "places which by

long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate
er,

to

justify

... ."
its

460

u.s.,

holding

by

at 45.
relying

CA9 then proceeds, howevon other circuit cases.

While this method of argument certainly isn't inappropriate, CA9

never explains why the CTA at LAX can be considered to be a place
}\

'

One can surmise that ~A9 was at

devoted to assembly and debate.

I

/t

p ~t

least in

influenced by the stipulated facts presented to the
.
5k~
de which the court did not discuss.
Significan ~ facts included:
the public is permitted unrestricted access to CTA; a variety of
groups have engaged in First Amendment activities in the CTA during the past 10 years and petrs have been aware of these activities;

the CTA have been used on a number of occasions by print,

television,

and

radio

media

for

filming,

photographing

and/or

interviewing public figures; artwork created by children has been
displayed
taining

in the CTA with the consent of petrs;

a display per-

to protected animal species has been constructed in one

terminal with

the

consent of petrs;

petrs have not and do not

prohibit persons wearing T-shirts or other articles of clothing
imprinted with slogans,

statements, or other

forms of religious

or political communication from walking in the CTA.

See Petn Ap

1 3-8.
While

strict

application

of

the

stipulated

facts

to

the

legal standard doesn't compel CA9's conclusion that the CTA is a
traditional public forum, the decision is arguably correct.

And,

given the uniformity among the circuits that have considered the
issue, I see no reason to review this case.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There is a response.
September 16, 1986

Burcham

Opin in petn.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

January 27, 1987

Justice Powell
Leslie
No. 86-104

Board of Airport Commns. of LAX v. Jews for Jesus
Cert. to CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, Alarcon)
Tuesday, March 3, 1987 (first argument)
I.

Summary

The question presented in this case is whether an
airport operator constitutionally may prohibit First Amendment expressive activities within the interior of the airport.
II.

Background

Petrs are the City of Los Angeles and the Board of
Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles.

The Board

pursuant to the city charter manages and controls 1 all airports

owned

by

Airport (LAX).

L.A.,

including

Los

.~

Angeles

InterJpational

Resps are a nonprofit religious corporation

and a minister of the religious faith, Alan Howard Snyder.
The focus of this suit is

~~adopted

on July 13, 1983, that pro

ide.s-'!..t~ the

by the Board

Central Terminal

Area as Los Angeles International Airport is not open for
First Amendment activities by an individual and/or entity"
and

that

"if

any

individual

or

entity

engages

in

First

Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area as Los
Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City
of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litigation against such individual and/or entity to ensure cornpliance with this Policy Statement of the Board of Airport Cornmissioners."

__..-----,

On July 6,

1984, ~~was

distributing free reli-

gious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central Terrninal Area
formed

(CTA)

at LAX when he was approached by a uni-

Department of Airports

peace officer.

The

officer

showed Snyder a copy of the Resolution, explained that Snyder was violating the Resolution, and asked Snyder to leave.
The officer warned Snyder that if he refused to leave the
City would take legal action against him.

Snyder stopped

distributing the material and immediately left the terminal.
On July 17, 1984, Jews for Jesus filed suit in DC
seeking a declaration of

··-

their

rights to distribute reli-

gious literature in public areas in the CTA.

~

~

Resps raised

···•

.

:;.-~

...

.a;---;J-

~nd

three challenges under both the federal
tions:

--

state Constitu·;
that the resolution was unconstitutiona~ on its

(1)

face because it totally bans First Amendment activities in a
public forum;
as applied to

( 2)

that the Resolution is unconstitutional

resps because it has only been used to ban

certain types of communicative conduct;
unconstitutionally

vague

and

and (3) that it is

overbroad

because

the

term

"First Amendment activities" does not give guidance to officials or the public as to what activity is prohibited.
~
Before the DC, the parties orally stipulated to the 5~~~
facts, and the DC treated the trial briefs as cross-motions
for summary judgment.

The DC held that the CTA is a tradi-

tional public forum, declared the total ban on First Amendment activities unconstitutional on its face,

and declined

to

The

reach

the

other

issues

raised

by

resps.

v

CA9

af-

firmed, as follows.
The

Supreme

Court

has

indicated

the

proper

First/.)~!~

~52..--t.

Amendment

First,

analysis.

challenged
Amendment.

activity
If

it

forum is at issue.

or
is,

the

speech
the

is

question

is

protected

next question

whether
by

the

is what

the

First

type

of

The final question is whether the justi-

fications for exclusion satisfy the standards for the particular type of forum.

- -

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &

---~

Educational Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3446 (1985).
There is no question that the distribution of literature is protected by the First Amendment.
tion in

this

case

is whether

The first ques-

the CTA is a

public forum.

;~I

ty

This circuit and every other circuit to have addressed the
'
1
issue have found that airport terminals are public ') forums.
'

Rosen v. City of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981)
land International Airport);
479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973)
Military Project v.
cert. denied, 421

u.s.

Kuszynski v. City of Oakland,

(Oakland Airport);

City of

(Port-

Chicago,

992 (1975)

Chicago Area

508 F. 2d 921

(CA7),

(Chicago O'Hare);

United

States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v.
United

States,

Dulles);

708

F.

Fernandes v.

(Dallas-Fort Worth).
cases,

2d

760

Limmer,

(CADC
663

1983)
F.

According to the

2d

(National
619

and

(CAS

1981)

reasoning of

these

the CTA is a traditional public forum.

The Board's

interest in limiting the use of the terminal facilities to
airport-related purposes is not sufficiently compelling to
justify absolute

prohibition of

First Amendment activity.

The Board is free to impose reasonable time, place and manner

limitations on the distribution of

literature

in

the

CTA.
III.

Analysis

~

Jurisdictional Questions
The
Krishna

-------

ess of California, Inc., raises jurisdic-

tional questions not mentioned by either of the parties to
this suit.

The Krishnas successfully convinced another DC

(Rafeedie, J.) to dismiss an identical suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

The DC reasoned that there was

presently no case or controversy before the court.

Immedi-

-·
'.

ately after

the resolution was passed, LAX
offici1als dis,
.~

tributed copies of the Resolution to Krishna

member ~.

this may have created a case or controversy,

While

the Krishnas

stated that their members had not subsequently been harassed
by airport officials.

Additionally,

the ~~

provides that the Board "shall have power • • • to ~ e and
enforce all necessary rules and regulations governing the
use and control of all municipal airports with the City of
Los Angeles."

The provision then states that "said regula-

____________the~uncil

tions shall be approved by
shall prescribe

__,~~.-,._.,,--.....

_____
by______
ordinance which

the penalties for violation of such rules

and regulations."

Another section states that the general

manager of the airport department "shall have the power and
duty to enforce all orders, rules and regulations adopted by
the Board."

The charter does not provide for the Board to

pass resolutions as it did in this case.
Council ratified the Board's resolution.
that

-

enforcement

of

the

resolution

was

Nor has the City

~~
~~

The DC thus found ~ .SA- ,J.,;
speculative,

and

therefore there did not exist sufficient adversity between
the parties to create a case or controversy.

It found that

the case was improvidently removed to federal court on the

-

~

,.~~

c/-

~ ~
~

~-!-

-?--~~

federal issue, and remanded the case to state court.
The Krishnas argue that this same reasoning applies
to this case.

They claim that the resolution has never been

formally enforced against anyone since its passage in
and that in its present form it cannot be.

~

1983, ~~

The Krishnas

argue that the Court should DIG the case for lack 1of ripeness.
The Krishnas also argue that a decision on the federal public forum doctrine will violate the long established
rule of avoiding federal constitutional adjudication where
nonfederal grounds for decision are available.

The parties

raised both state and federal constitutional issues below,
----------------------~-----~

and the lower courts improperly reached the federal issues
before

deciding

the

state

ones.

California

found the state Constitution Article I,

courts

have

section 2 to be a

"protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the
[federal]

First Amendment."

Cal. 3d 652, 658

(1975).

Wilson v.

Superior Court,

13

Under €!- ifornia 1! 0 areas such
'--'---~----

C~

~~ .

grounds,

~

interior premises of state owned visitor's centers and major

~~f~

as

convention

centers,

transportation

shopping

terminals

(main

centers,

entrance,

prison

lobby

and

patio

l<k

areas of the Union Station railway terminal in L.A.) must be
made available for

the reasonable exercise of First Amend-

See citations in Krishna Brief--~
15. The Krish-

ment rights.

nas argue that the decision below should be vacated and remanded
issue.

for

a

decision

first

on

the

state

constitutional

Resps indicate in a footnote that a state constitu-

tional violation was alleged in the complaint and extensively argued in the lower courts, but the courts "inexplicably
ignored the state constitution."
Both
bling.

of

these

Resp. Brief 21, n. 32.

jurisdictional

You might want to

sk questions

arguments

are

trou- ~

directed

toward either of these concerns.
tion is different

~ the

Perhaps . the factual situa-

Krishna case.

Of

partic~lar

im-

portance is whether the DC in the Krishna case was correct
that

the

Resolution

as

it

now

stands

is

unenforceable.

There is always the argument that the mere existence of the
Resolution

has

in

intolerable

Amendment activity.

chilling

The DC in the

this argument compelling.

'K;l-~h;~

effect

on

First

case did not find

Also, since only the Krishnas

~~~

J;::;:;;-

an~~

resps have briefed the relevance of state law, there may be

~

some arguments against its applicability that are not imme- - ~ ~
diately obvious.
ence

In sum, if there is sentiment at Confer-l

to DIG or vacate and remand the case,

it appears a 0

lr'v

~

~

this point that either would be justified.
B.
1.

The Merits

Traditional Public Forum

The first question in this case is whether the CTA
is a

public forum.

(Note

that only the Central Terminal ~

~~

Area is at issue, not the terminal areas leading to individual

gates or directly to the planes.)

Traditional public

forums are "those places which 'by long tradition or by government fiat

have been devoted

to assembly

and

debate.'"

Cornelius, supra, at 3449 (quoting Perry Education Association

v.

(1983)).

ry."

Perry

Local

Educators'

Association,

460

u.s.

37

"Public streets and parks fall into this catego-

Ibid.

Traditional public forums are dedicated to the

free exchange of ideas.

The only restrictions that the gov-

ernment may impose on speech in such areas are those that

··"·'··
'

~~

are "content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a sigi

nificant government interest, and leave open ample a~ternate
channels of communication."

The~ound

forum,

relyJ.ng

court cases.

Perry, supra, at 45.

that the CTA is a traditional public

largely

on

the

analysis

of

other

circuit

This circuit court cases addressed several of

the argument raised by petrs in this case.
Military Project, supra,

In Chicago Area

the ~

[ T] he plaintiffs here do not claim any right to
distribute leaflets on airplanes or in other privately owned or leased places but only in the spacious, city-owned common areas which resemble
those public thoroughfares which have been long
recognized to be particularly appropriate places
for the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights to communicate ideas and information ••••
The City's claim that t e--ptlb~eceives a
limited invitation to use
Hare Airport or travel purposes only is not s
ted
e evidence
nor do we think it is realistic.
For the fact is
that great numbers of people are freely admitted
to the public areas of the terminal buildings not
only in connection with air travel, but also for
shopping, dining, sightseeing, or merely to satisfy their curiosity. There is no question but that
the terminal buildings at O'Hare Airport, cityowned and operated, are freely available to the
general public and that their wide-open public
areas which perhaps 90,000 transients visit daily
can accommodate seven persons peacefully distributing, in groups of twos and threes, free copies
of their publication to interested persons.
508 F. 2d,

As
In finding the airport
to
be a public forum, we do n
hold that
within the terminals is public.
s the district
court noted,
, those parts of the terminals
restricted to airline personnel are private, absent unusual circumstances. Likewise, the arrival
and departure gates, where only ticketed passen-

4

- - J-

gers may go, are not public forums.
The parallel
between public streets and the ciescent-sha~ed
central concourses of the ••• terminal buildings,
where air travelers as well as the general public
may shop, dine, imbibe, and sightsee, is clear and
powerful, however. The analogy between these terminal concourses and public streets is further
strengthened by the lack of restrictions on public
access to the commercial establishments located
along the crescent-shaped passageways, whether or
not persons must pass through security check
points first.
663 F. 2d, at 627.

Th~~eached

the same result:

The Council seeks to place its advertisements
in those open areas of National and Dulles Airports that contain many of the facilities and
services of a fair-sized municipality.
Roughly
eighteen million people pass through the concourses and walkways of these two airports each
year, enjoying the benefits of restaurants and
snack bars, two post offices, various speciality
shops, two medical stations, at least five bars, a
barber shop, drug stores, banks, newsstands, and
police stations •••• Although not every form of
speech is necessarily consistent with t~ai rport's primary use, it seems clear that the public
places in these airports are far more akin to such
public forums as streets and common areas than
they are to such nonforums as prisons, buses, and
military bases.
708 F. 2d, at 764.
Petrs argue that the airport has not been opened to
communicative activities, but instead has been consistently
devoted to air travel-related activities.
this case

is like Greer

v.

Spock,

424

Petrs argue that

u.s.

828

( 1976)'

where the Court found that the exterior sidewalk areas of a
military base were not to be treated the same as a municipal i ty' s

open streets

and

parks.

The circuit courts ad-

dressed these arguments above in a way that seems convinc-

-

-

ing.

Petrs do not, and cannot, contend that LAX is ,not geni

Instead, they argue thcit it is

erally open to the public.
not dedicated to expression.

But, it seems that concourses

like those in LAX are dedicated to expression the same way
as are streets and sidewalks.

Both streets and sidewalks

have purposes other than as forums for communication -- both
are used for

transportation.

Their public forum character

comes from the fact that they are generally open to the publie

and

speech

activities

are

with their functional uses.

not

generally

incompatible

This would seem to be equally

true for an airport, which is simply a gathering center for
individuals using a more modern form of transportation.
The

DC' s

factual

findings

support

the

conclusion

that the CTA of LAX is generally open to the public and has
the characteristics of a traditional public forum:
The [petrs] have not restricted access by members of the general public to the interior of terminal areas at LAX to only those persons who are
engaged in the use of LAX facilities for interstate travel of for purposes of meeting or greeting airline passengers.
The [petrs] do not attempt to restrict members of the general public
from walking through the unrestricted interior of
terminal areas at LAX.
[Petrs] do not attempt to
restrict members of the general public who have no
purpose or desire to utilize the transportationrelated facilities within the terminal areas at
LAX from walking,
reading,
shopping,
eating,
drinking, and conversing with other members of the
general public in the interior of terminal areas
at LAX.
Pet. App. 8.
ni~

The DC also found that LAX officials had defrom certain groups to conduct certain activi-

--

ties in the airport, e.g., the Red Cross, the Girl

" '

~~

~

~

Scouts, ~

the Salvation Army.

Although the findin,g s of fact do not
il

make clear

exactly what activities these groups SQught to

conduct, they were almost certainly on a larger scale than a
few

individuals

groups

sought

distributing

to

conduct

free

literature.

activities

If

that would

these

interfere

with the interstate travel function of the airport, reasonable time,

place and manner restrictions could forbid them

from doing so no matter what type of forum the airport was
found to be.
CTA has

Consequently,

generally

been

open

the CA9' s
to

conclusion that the

reasonable,

nondisruptive

speech activities appears correct.
2.

Nontraditional Public Forum

Opened For Expressive Activity
Even if a particular area is not a public forum, it
can become one if the government "open[s]
public forum for
5120.

public discourse."

a nontraditional

Cornelius,

supra,

at

Resps argue that the Board has opened LAX for cornrnu~

plays,

~

The CTA has newsstands, photo disactivities.
~
and a C ristian Science Reading Room
It is diffi-

nicative

-----·--;;-;;---.---.----:-::

str ~ctly

related to the

airport function of facilitating air travel.

Where the gov-

cult

to argue

that

these are all

ernrnent has opened a particular forum,

it cannot discrimi-

nate against speakers on the basis of the content of their
speech.
ties."

The Resolution bans

"all First Amendment activi-

It would seem that the Board would either have to

ban all of the above First Amendment activities, as well as
the Jews for Jesus, or allow all to speak.

'·

page 12.

It is important to emphasize that' the CA9

a~d

other

'l

circuit courts have recognized that all First Amendment activities
time,

in

airport

terminals

are

place and manner restrictions.

to distribute

subject

to

reasonable

Thus, groups wishing

religious literature may be

subject

to re-

strictions that limit their intrusiveness and ensure

that

their activities do not disturb the primary function of the
airport.
3.

Compelling Interest

If the CTA is a traditional public forum, or a forum
opened for expressive activity,
prohibit First

Amendment

the Board can nevertheless

activities

if

its

Resolution is

narrowly drawn and is necessary to serve a compelling interest.

It is difficult

't;'- ~ay

that a resolution banning "all

First Amendment activity" is narrowly drawn.

Moreover, the

~

~
~~

CA9 appears to have properly found that the Board has no
compelling interest to support its regulation.
ticulated interest is:

The one ar-

"The Los Angeles City Charter

re-

quires the Board to operate all of its properties for promotion and accommodation of air navigation and air commerce
and uses incidental thereto."

This interest does not appear

compelling in light of the DC' s factual

findings that the

---------.

Board does not limit the CTA to air travel-related activities in other respects.

The

~~that

distributing the religious literature, Snyder was not

"[i]n

?u>l-

block-~

ing any entrance, exit stairway, escalator, elevator, door

------------..

or otherwise inhibiting the free flow of pedestrian traffic"

page 13.

and that "Snyder was not touching, annoying,

block~ng,

ob-

I

structing,

or otherwise harassing any other person present

in the immediate vicinity of his location on the pedestrian
walkway."

Thus, it appears that the Resolution was not nar-

rowly drawn to accomplish its purpose of preventing interference with air travel.
4.

Other Arguments

Resps also argue that the term "First Amendment activities"

in the Resolution allows airport official imper-

missible discretion to choose which groups will be subject
to

the

regulation,

that

the

exercise

of

the

discretion

amounts to a prior restraint, and the implementation of the
policy

embodies

impermissible

religious discrimination.

content

discrimination

and

The CA9 decided only the tradi-----~

tional public forum question.

----

ate for
Even

if

Thus, it would be inappropri-

~

this Court to decide the additional issues raised.
the

Court

decides

that

the

CTA is not a

public

forum, the appropriate remedy would be to remand the case to
the CA9 to decide the other questions raised.
IV.
There
First,

-

are

it appears that

enforceable.

preliminary

problems

in

this

case.

the Resolution at issue me.y not be

If it is not, there is a question whether this

action presents a
federal

two

Conclusion

case or controversy.

courts failed

Second,

the lower

to address the state constitutional

issues although they were briefed and argued, and although
it appears that the state constitution could have provided

page 14.

an independent ground for this decision.

'Given the uniform'1
I

ity of the circuits on the federal constitutional issue, and
the availability of state constitutional grounds, the Court

- - -- ---- 8- - ------------...

should consider seriously whether the case should be vacated

-

and remanded for consideration of the state constitutional

-----

issue.

-·

If the Court reaches the merits, it appears that the

CA9 was correct.
nal

bear

the

The wide open spaces of an airport termi-

indicia of

though petrs argue
because

airports

that

a

________

traditional
.....___

the

forum

are modern,

public ___.,
forum.

cannot

be

~

Al-

traditional,

the question is whether the

area is analogous to a traditional public forum.

Tradition-

al public forums are streets, sidewalks and parks.

The CTA

in this case contains broad walking areas, with shops and
restaurants along it,
converse.

Because

and benches for people to sit in and

of

modern

technology,

airports

_________ --------- ---

fact one of the largest gathering places of all.

are

in

A holding

...--.

in this case that the CTA is a traditional public forum will
not apply to all government-owned property.

The focus al-

ways remains on the characteristics of the place.
characteristics

are

remarkably

similar

to

Here, the

classic

public

forums traditionally open for First Amendment activities.
Even if the CTA is not a traditional public forum,
it may be a forum opened by the Board for First Amendment
activities.

The Board allows numerous other speech-related

activities to occur in the CTA.

Thus,

it appears that it

has opened the area to First Amendment activities compatible

........

r

page 15.

with the function of the airport -- facilitating

air ~

travel.

''\

There is no

indication that resps proposed activities are

incompatible.
No matter what type of forum the CTA is, the Board
can impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on
speakers.

These limitations are a narrowly tailored way to

ensure that speech activities do not intrude on the function
of the airport.
For all of the above reasons,
the

Court

reaches

the merits,

~-----------

firmed.

the

I

recommend that if

CA9 's decision

be

af-
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Justice Powell

January 27, 1987

Leslie
No. 86-104
Board of Airport Commns. of LAX v. Jews for Jesus
Cert. to CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, Alarcon)
Tuesday, March 3, 1987 (first argument)
I.

Summary

The question presented in

this case is whether an

airport operator constitutionally may prohibit First Amendment expressive activities within the interior of the airport.
II.

Background

Petrs are the City of Los Angeles and the Board of
Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles.

The Board

pursuant to the city charter manages and controls 'all airports owned by L.A.,
Airport (LAX).

.~

including Los Angeles Inter·p ational

Resps are a nonprofit religious corporation

and a minister of the religious faith, Alan Howard Snyder.
The focus of this suit is

~adopted

by the Board

on July 13, 1983, that pro · de.s- '!-t.7 t the Central Terminal
Area as Los Angeles International Airport is not open for
First Amendment activities by an individual and/or entity"
and

that

"if

any

individual

or

entity engages

in First

Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area as Los
Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City
of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litigation against such individual and/or entity to ensure cornpliance with this Policy Statement of the Board of Airport Cornrni s sione r s. "

.----·--.. .

On July 6,

1984,~~was

distributing free reli-

gious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central Terrninal Area

(CTA)

at LAX when he was approached by a uni-

formed Department of Airports peace officer.

The officer

showed Snyder a copy of the Resolution, explained that Snyder was violating the Resolution, and asked Snyder to leave.
The officer warned Snyder that if he refused to leave the
City would take legal action against him.

Snyder stopped

distributing the material and immediately left the terminal.
On July 17, 1984, Jews for Jesus filed suit in DC ~
seeking a declaration of their rights to distribute religious literature in public areas in the CTA •

.

•:,~". ~·~·-r.. ;

Resps raised

~

three challenges under both the federal and state eonstituI;

tions:

(1)

that the resolution was unconstitutionaf on its

face because it totally bans First Amendment activities in a
public forum;
as applied to

( 2)

that the Resolution is unconstitutional

resps because it has only been used to ban

certain types of communicative conduct;
unconstitutionally

vague

and

and (3) that it is

overbroad

because

the

term

"First Amendment activities" does not give guidance to officials or the public as to what activity is prohibited.
~
Before the DC, the parties orally stipulated to the 5~~~
facts, and the DC treated the trial briefs as cross-motions
for summary judgment.

The DC held that the CTA is a tradi-

tional public forum, declared the total ban on First Amendment activities unconstitutional on its face,

and declined

to

The

reach

the

other

issues

raised

by

resps.

v

CA9

af-

firmed, as follows.
The

Supreme

Court

has

indicated

the

proper

First~~!~

~5t..--L.

Amendment
challenged
Amendment.

analysis.
activity
If

it

forum is at issue.

First,
or
is,

the

speech
the

is

question

is

protected

next question

whether
by

is what

First

type

of

The final question is whether the justi-

fications for exclusion satisfy the standards for
ticular type of forum.
-·-

the

the

the par-

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &

--~

Educational Fund, Inc., 105

s.

Ct. 3439, 3446 (1985).

There is no question that the distribution of literature is protected by the First Amendment.
tion in this

case

is whether

The first ques-

the CTA is a

public forum.

;~I

cy

This circuit and every other circuit to have addressed the
~·

I

issue have found that airport terminals are public j forums.
Rosen v. City of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981)
land International Airport);
479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973)
Military Project v.

u.s.

cert. denied, 421

Kuszynski v. City of Oakland,

(Oakland Airport);

City of

(Port-

Chicago,

992 (1975)

Chicago Area

508 F. 2d 921

(CA7),

(Chicago O'Hare);

United

States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v.
United

States,

Dulles);

708

F.

Fernandes v.

(Dallas-Fort Worth).
cases,

2d

760

Limmer,

(CADC
663

1983)
F.

According to the

2d

(National
619

and

(CAS

1981)

reasoning of

these

the CTA is a traditional public forum.

The Board's

interest in limiting the use of the terminal facilities to
airport-related purposes is not sufficiently compelling to
justify absolute

prohibition of

First Amendment activity.

The Board is free to impose reasonable time, place and manner

limitations on the distribution of

literature

in

the

CTA.
III.
A.

~

Jurisdictional Questions

The
Krishna

Analysis

International Society for
ness of California, Inc., raises jurisdic-

tional questions not mentioned by either of the parties to
---.._...-this suit.
The Krishnas successfully convinced another DC
(Rafeedie, J.) to dismiss an identical suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

The DC reasoned that there was

presently no case or controversy before the court.

Immedi-

ately after

the

resolution was passed,

~AX

tributed copies of the Resolution to Krishna

offici1als dis.~
member ~.

this may have created a case or controversy,

While

the Krishnas

stated that their members had not subsequently been harassed
by airport officials.

Additionally,

the ~_!:~

provides that the Board "shall have power
enforce

all

necessary rules and

••• to ~ e and

regulations governing the

use and control of all municipal airports with the City of
Los Angeles."

The provision then states that "said regula-

tions shall _be
by_ _
the~uncil
ordinance
which
_ _approved
______
__,'-l.----a..-.. . - -..by
____ _ _
_
shall prescribe

the penalties for violation of such rules

and regulations."

Another section states that the general

manager of the airport department "shall have the power and
duty to enforce all orders, rules and regulations adopted by

pass resolutions as it did in this case.
Council ratified the Board's resolution.

--

therefore there did not exist sufficient adversity between
the parties to create a case or controversy.

-

federal issue, and remanded the case to state court.
The Krishnas argue that this same reasoning applies
to this case.

They claim that the resolution has never been

formally enforced against anyone since its passage in
and that in its present form

it cannot be.

~

1983, ~~

The Krishnas

argue that the Court should DIG the case for lack 1of ripeness.
The Krishnas also argue that a decision on the federal public forum doctrine will violate the long established
rule of avoiding federal constitutional adjudication where
nonfederal grounds for decision are available.

The parties

raised both state and federal constitutional issues below,
and the lower courts improperly reached the federal issues
before

deciding

the

state

ones.

California

found the state Constitution Article I,

courts

have

section 2 to be a

"protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the
[federal]

First Amendment."

Cal. 3d 652, 658
as

convention

(1975).

Wilson v.

Superior Court,

~~iii)

Under

areas such

~:.:.__
shopping centers, prison

centers,

13

grounds,

('>A.

I

~r

~f .
~

interior premises of state owned visitor's centers and

major ~~~

transportation

patio

terminals

(main

entrance,

lobby

and

l<k

areas of the Union Station railway terminal in L.A.) must be
made available for

the reasonable exercise of First Amend-

See-------------------------------------~
citations in Krishna Brief 15. The Krish-

ment rights.

nas argue that the decision below should be vacated and remanded
issue.

for

a

decision

first

on

the

state

constitutional

Resps indicate in a footnote that a state constitu-

tional violation was alleged in the complaint and extensively argued in the lower courts, but the courts "inexplicably
ignored the state constitution."
Both
bling.

of

these

Resp. Brief 21, n. 32.

jurisdictional

You might want to

arguments

sk questions

~-----------

are

trou-

directed

/~

toward either of these concerns.
tion is different

~ the

Perhaps the factual situa-

Krishna case.

Of

partic ~lar

im-

portance is whether the DC in the Krishna case was correct
that

the

Resolution

as

it

now

stands

is

unenforceable.

There is always the argument that the mere existence of the
Resolution

has

in

intolerable

Amendment activity.

chilling

effect

on

First

The DC in the 'Krishna case did not find

this argument compelling.

Also, since only the Krishnas

~~f

~

an~~

resps have briefed the relevance of state law, there may be

~

some arguments against its applicability that are not imme- - ~~
diately obvious.
ence

In sum, if there is sentiment at Confer-l

to DIG or vacate and remand the case,

it appears a

lr'v

~

:J ~

this point that either would be justified.
B.
1.

The Merits

Traditional Public Forum

The first question in this case is whether the CTA
is a

public forum.

{Note

that only the Central Terminal

Area is at issue, not the terminal areas leading to individual

gates or directly to the planes.)

Traditional public

forums are "those places which 'by long tradition or by government fiat

have been devoted

to assembly

and

debate.'"

Cornelius, supra, at 3449 {quoting Perry Education Association

v.

{1983)).
ry."

Perry

Local

Educators'

Association,

460

U.S.

37

"Public streets and parks fall into this catego-

Ibid.

Traditional public forums are dedicated to the

free exchange of ideas.

~

~h4..12

The only restrictions that the gov-

ernment may impose on speech in such areas are those that

~~

February 4, 1987
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Board of Airport Commissioners (L.A.) v. Jews for

Jesus (CA9)

Memo to File:
Although the two questions on which we granted cert.
are

stated

in

some

detail,

the

courts

below

and

both

parties here agree that the central question is whether
the Los Angeles Airport is a "public forum."
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners
of the City adopted a resolution that states in part:
"Now, therefore be it resolved by the Board of
Airport Commissioners that the central term~nal
area at Los Angeles International Airport i §_Qpt
o en fo
First Amendment activ'ties by any
ind1v1dual and or entity; • • • "
In July 1984, Snyder--a minister of Jews for Jesus--

-

was distributing free religious literature on a pedestrian
walkway

--.......

in

the

central

terminal

area when a

uniformed

officer read Snyder the resolution, and threatened to have

2.

legal

action

taken

against

distributing the leaflets.
and

Snyder

(hereafter

him

unless

he

stopped

Shortly thereafter, respondent
"the

respondents")

filed

this

Section 1983 suit seeking a declaration of their rights to
distribute religious literature in the public areas of the
airport.

Respondents,

validity

of

the

in their complaint, challenged the

resolution

under

both

state constitutions on three grounds:

the
(i)

federal

and

on its face,

because it totally bans First Amendment activities in a
public forum;
to

(ii) that it is unconstitutional as applied

respondents

certain

kinds

because
of

it

has

only

been

communicative conduct

distributing leaflets by respondents;

used

such as

and (iii)

to
that

ban
of

that the

resolution is "vague and overbroad."

Bath the DC and

CA9 held the resolution invalid

face, and therefor

o~ts

did not reach the "as applied" and "vague and overbroad"
issues.
There is a rather elaborate stipulation of facts in
Appendix 1 to the petition for cert.
sort

of

activities

terminals,

._..--

we're

including

all

These indicate the

familiar

with

v-advertisements,

it

rather

than

the

Board of

Airport

airport

~

restaurants,

newsstands,~all shops,~ s, and the like.

use

in

The City (I

Commissioners)

3.

asserts

that

permitted

it

the

has

never

airport

related activities",

to

intentionally

be

used

except

or

knowingly

for

"airport

although this is a term not defined

in the resolution at issue or--as far as I know--anywhere
else.
The

courts

below,

both

the

DC

and

CA9,

had

no

difficulty in concluding rather summarily that this type
of

airport

is

a

"public

forum."

In

addition

to

emphasizing that literally millions of people use the L.A.
Airport annually, including a significant number of people
who are not necessarily there for airport purposes.

The

City argues quite reasonably that if Jews for Jesus are
permitted to hand out pamphlets,

hundreds of political,

religious, charitable and other types of entities may wish
to do likewise.
on

behalf

of

a

Moreover,

in a rather silly brief filed

AFL-CIA,

it

Airport Resolution that bans

is

argued

that

under

the

"First Amendment activities

by any individual and or entity", even a single individual
could

not

hand

out

pamphlets,

engage

in

political

conversation, try to persuade a friend or acquaintance to
a particular point of view,

or do much more of anything

other than board or leave airplanes, wait for airplanes,

4.

or accompany people who are flying in or out of airports
to meet them or bid goodbye.
The

courts

decisions
United

that

have

States

Dulles,

below

to

decisions

below

did,

would

be

held

be

National,

these

naturally

have

that

properly

major

relied on

airports

foria",

place,

appropriate

as

and
if

in

including

and perhaps others.

emphasized,

"time,

entirely

other

"public

Dallas,

and

indeed
matter"

reasonably

the

O'Hare,

I believe
the

courts

regulations
related

to

preventing the sort of problems that the City emphasizes
in its briefs.

It is conceded that the Board of Airport

Commissioners of Los Angeles preferred the absolute ban to
"time,

place

and

matter

regulations",

and

this

is

the

position taken in this case.

*
In
presented

light
to

of
us,

resolution that

the

*

posture

namely,

provides

Amendment activity",

*
as
an

in
a

which

facial

this

case

challenge

absolute ban on any

to

is
a

"First

it is not easy to see how we can do

otherwise than to affirm CA9.

Indeed, a good deal can be

said for dismissing the case as improvidently granted.

I

regret that although I had marked my cert memo to deny, I

5.

was

persuaded

at

conference

to

"join

three"--without

having read the briefs.
If my clerk agrees, a 2 or 3 page memo will suffice.

LFP, JR.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 86-104
BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER,
AKA AVI SNYDER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

c=...~

,.,_.__

[April - , 1987]

JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner Board of Airport Commissioners seeks
review of the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is a
"public forum" under the Federal Constitution. Because the
Court of Appeals failed to address respondents' parallel and
potentially dispositive claim under the California Constitution, we vacate the judgment below and remand for consideration of the state law claim.
I
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners
(Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides in
pertinent part:
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the
Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles lhternational Airport is not
open for First Amendment activities by any individual
and/or entity;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effective
date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or entity
seeks to engage in First Amendment activities within
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the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International
Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be deemed to
be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the
Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to the uses
permitted within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any individual or
entity engages in First Amendment activities within the
Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litigation against such
individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this
Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commission- ··
ers. . . ." App. 4a-5a.
Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc. is a non-profit religious
corporation. On July 6, 1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a minister of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, was stopped by a Department of Airports peace officer while distributing free
religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central
Terminal Area at LAX. The officer showed Snyder a copy
of the resolution, explained that Snyder's activities violated
the resolution, and requested that Snyder leave LAX. The
officer warned Snyder that the City would take legal action
against him if he refused to leave as requested. App.
19a-20a. Snyder stopped distributing the leaflets and left
the airport terminal. App. 20a.
Jews for Jesus and Snyder then filed this action in the District Court for the Central District of California, challenging
the constitutionality of the resolution under both the California and Federal Constitutions. First, respondents contended that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under
Art. I, § 2 of the California Constitution and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it
bans all speech in a public forum. Second, they alleged that
the resolution had been applied to Jews for Jesus in a dis-
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criminatory manner. Finally, respondents urged that the
resolution is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
When the case came before the District Court for trial, the
parties orally stipulated to the facts, and the District Court
treated the trial briefs as cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held that the Central Terminal
Area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and
held that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under
the United States Constitution. The District Court declined
to reach the other issues raised by Jews for Jesus, and did
not address the constitutionality of the resolution under the
California Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 785 F. 2d 791 (1986). Relying on Rosen
v. Port of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981), and
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973),
the Court of Appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a
traditional public forum," 785 F. 2d, at 795, and held that
the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the Federal Constitution. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - (1986), and now vacate and remand.
II

In their complaint, Jews for Jesus alleged a violation of the
as well as the Federal Constitution.
The Lio erty of s-peech Clause of the California Constitution
provides:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." Cal. Const., Art. I,
§ 2(a).
In recent years, the California courts have interpreted the
California Liberty of Speech Clause to provide greater protection for expressive activity than that provilled by- the
First Amen me
o e mted States Constitution. Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P. 2d 116, 120
Ca~~!!Etion

~
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(1975) (The California Liberty of Speech Clause is "more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment"). Most notably, the California courts have adopted a view of "public
forum" under the Liberty of Speech Clause that is more expansive than that expressed by this Court in cases arising
under the First Amendment. Under the First Amendment,
this Court has stated that a public forum must be either a
"traditional" public forum such as a street or park that has by
long tradition been devoted to assembly or speech, or a "designated" public forum such as a municipal theater created by
government designation as a place of communication. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,-- U.S.
- - , - - (1985)i Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. ·
Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The California Courts
have adopted a different approach. In In re Hoffman, 67
Cal. 2d 845, 434 P. 2d 353 (1967), the California Supreme
Court held that a railway terminal was a public forum because expressive activity was not inconsistent with the use of
the terminal:
"The primary uses of municipal property can amply be
protected by ordinances that prohibit activities that interfere with those uses. Similarly, the primary uses of
railway stations can be amply protected by ordinances
prohibiting activities that interfere with those uses. In
neither case can First Amendment activities be prohibited solely because the property involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for such activities.
"[I]n the present case, the test is not whether petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether it
interfered with that use." 67 Cal. 2d, at 850-851, 434 P.
2d, at 356.
Although In re Hoffman itself did not clearly indicate that
it rested on state law, the California courts have subsequently cited it as an aid to interpretation of the California
Constitution. Thus, in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Cen-

l
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ter, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P. 2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 447 U. S. 74
(1980), the California Supreme Court held that private shopping malls are public fora under the California Liberty of
Speech Clause, relying in part on In re Hoffman, supra, despite the fact that this Court had already held in Tanne~.
Lloy
orp., a., 4 7 U. S. 551 (1972), that t e ederal
Constitution offered no such protection for expressive activities. See also Prisoners Union v. California Department of
Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1982)
(prison parking lot is public forum under California Constitution); University of California Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 154 Cal.
App. 3d 1157, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1984) (visitor center is a ·
public forum under California Constitution).
Under the California Liberty of Speech Clause, therefore,
the "public forum" doctrine "is not limited to traditional public f~ts, sid wa s, an ~ s or ~ites
de~ative activity such as municipal theaters. Rather, the test under alifornia law is whether the
communicative activity 'is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.'"
Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F. 2d 1039, 1045 (CA9
1985), quoting Prisoners Union v. California Department of
Corrections, supra, at 939, 185 Cal. Rptr., at 639.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
described California's Liberty of Speech Clause as providing
"greater protection for expressive activity" than the First
Amendment, Carreras v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1044,
n. 7, nevertheless both the District Court and the Court of
Appeal failed to address respondents' claim that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under the California Constitution. Yet, under this Court's precedents federal courts
normally must address dispositive issues of state law before
considering claims under the Federal Constitution. In City
of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283 (1982),
this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals a constitutional

~
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challenge to a city ordinance governing coin-operated amusement establishments because the ordinance might violate the
Texas Constitution. We observed that "the language of the
Texas constitutional provision is different from, and arguably
significantly broader than, the language of the corresponding
federal provisions," id., at 293, and noted that "there is no
need for decision of the federal issue" if the state constitution
provided "independent support" for the plaintiff's requested
relief. Id., at 294-295. We concluded, consistent with this
Court's "policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of
federal constitutional issues," ibid. , that under these circumstances the case must be remanded to determine whether the
case could be resolved under the Texas Constitution. Simi:..
larly, this Court has on several occasions remanded a case on
Pullman abstention grounds when the apphcat10n of a state
cons 1 ut10na pro ision might prevent the need to reach a
Federal Constitutional issue. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401
U. S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); City
of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639
(1959). Thus, as a result of these precedents, "[t]here exists
a growing recognition among Federal Courts of Ap eals that
it is incum ent u on em to reso ve issues of s ate consti utionailaw efore reac -ing Issues ansing under the Federa onstltution." Delaware v. an rs a l, - - U. S.
- -:-=-----;TI. 15 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Indeed, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit itself has done precisely that in applying the "public forum" principles of California constitutional law rather than the First Amendment to
invalidate a city ordinance banning solicitation at the Anaheim Stadium and Anaheim Convention Center. Carreras
v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1042-1043.
The principle that federal courts should avoid resting a decision on Federal Constitutional grounds if a case can be decided on the basis of state law follows from the more general
and longstanding principle that federal courts should avoid
unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional issues.

l

.~
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See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S.
288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). As early as
1909, this Court recognized that federal courts should avoid
federal constitutional issues if a case can be decided on pendent state law grounds. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R . R., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909); see also Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U. S. 528, 547 (1974) ("Numerous decisions of this Court
have stated the general proposition endorsed in Siler . . . .
These and other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the
federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where
not absolutely essential to disposition of a case"). "[l]f a controverted question of state law underlay the question of federal law, it -[is] the district court's duty to decide the· state
question first . . . in order to avoid if possible a federal
constitutional question." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro
& H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 989 (2d ed. 1973). State constitutional
provisions that do more than merely mirror Federal Constitutional guarantees offer no less compelling a ground for
decision than state statutes and case law. Cf. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 652-653 (1979) (observing that some
State constitutional provisions will be interpreted by State
Courts to mirror Federal constitutional law). Particularly
when, as is the case here, the state constitution may provide
greater protection for individual rights than the United
States Constitution, the resolution of the federal claim may
be unnecessary to support the plaintiff's claim for relief. See
Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071,
1099-1100 (1974) ("When state law is truly clear and when
ruling on it would dispose of the case, it would seem appropriate for the federal court to rule on the state issue even if
the federal constitutional question is also clear and
nonsensitive").
In addition, principles of federalism compel the conclusion
that federal courts should first examine legitimate state con-

i
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stitutional claims, if their resolution is clear as a matter of
state law, before reaching any Federal Constitutional issues.
State constitutional law, no less than Federal Constitutional
law, has an important role to play in the protection of individual rights. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States' bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). But if state constitutional law is to play this role, the federal courts, no less than
the state courts, may be called upon to recognize and apply
settled state constitutional norms.
In this case several factors strongly counsel in favor of first
addressing the respondents' . pendent state claim before ·
reaching the Federal Constitutional issues. Respondents'
claim under the California Constitution is potentially dispositive, and is based on a state constitutional provision that
does not merely mirror the Federal Constitution. The California Courts have given the concept of "public forum" a settled meaning under the California Constitution that offers
broader protection to expressive activity in public facilities
than that under the First Amendment. There exists "[n]o
reason for hasty decision of the [federal] constitutional question presented by this case." City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's
Castle, Inc., supra, at 294. Because the District Court and
the Court of Appeals simply ignored respondents' claim
under the California Liberty of Speech Clause, we vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered .

. .,

lsg 04/09/87

MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

April 9, 1987

Leslie

No. 86-104, Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews For Jesus
Justice O'Connor's draft Court opinion is now circulating.

The

Confe renee voted

to dec ide

constitutional ground of overbreadth.

this

case

on

the

federal

The opinion, however,

re-

---

mands the case for consideration of the state constitutional is-

----...__.
sues.

This resolution seems desirable because the lower courts

should not have ignored the state law claim.

The decision will

stand as a message to the lower courts in all types of cases and
should reduce the federal questions that are unnecessarily decided.

In sum,

ingful

I think that decision on this ground is more mean-

than would be

the decisfon on overbreadth.

that you join the opinion.

I

recommend

.ltpt"tmt (lf&ttttt of tift~~

.tatu'
'

J[ulfinghm. ~. Of. 2llgi~~
CHAMBERS OF

April 10, 1987

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus
Dear Sandra,
I thought the conference vote was to rule that the
First Amendment did not require that this airport be
considered a public forum but that the ordinance is
nevertheless overbroad and unconstitutional.
I do not
disagree with your discussion of how the federal court
should have proceeded, and it would appear that the
courts below disregarded these prudential ground rules.
But they are not jurisdictional; and here both courts
dealt with the First Amendment issue, and we granted
certiorari to decide that question, which was briefed,
argued and submitted.
Nor was it argued at the
certiorari stage that the court below should have
decided the case on state law grounds.
In the
interests of running our own business efficiently and
avoiding any misapprehension about the federal law, I
would much rather express our disagreement on the
public forum issue as a matter of First Amendment law
and reverse outright, leaving the state law question
for decision on remand.
Or I could go on and, as the
conference voted, say that the ordinance is fatally
overbroad under the First Amendment.
In the course of
doing this, we could express our view as to how the
courts should have proceeded but did not.
Sincerely yours,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 10, 1987

Re:

86-104

Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews
for Jesus

Dear Byron,
I realize the conference expressed a
willingness to address the public forum issue and
overbreadth, but, in reviewing the proceedings below,
it seemed to me the Court of Appeals should have
decided the state law question rather than to decide
the case on the basis of federal 1st Amendment
doctrine. For us to reinforce that error by repeating
it here seemed to me to send the wrong signal.
Perhaps it would be helpful in the long run to vacate
and direct the Court of Appeals to consider the state
law question in these circumstances. If, after
reviewing the circulating draft, the Conference
remains of the view that federal public forum doctrine
should be the basis for our decision, I will abide by
that decision.

l

Sincerely,

~~
~~5~

J~~

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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BRENNAN, JR.

April 12, 1987

Re:

No. 86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for

Jesus
Dear Sandra,
Please join me.
With regard to Byron's comments and your response thereto,
my recollection of the sense at conference was that First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, and not the public forum
doctrine, was to be the basis of the court's decision. There was
not a court, as I recall, to affirm on the public forum grounds.
Since the judgment is to affirm, however, any discussion of the
public forum question would be unnecessary to the judgment, and
thus merely dictum. Accordingly, if you should decide to
withdraw the current draft, my sense would be that the Court
opinion should simply address the overbreadth issue, and leave
the public forum question to another day.

Sin~

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Apr1l 13, 1987

Re:

No. 86-104

Board of Airport Commissioners
v. Jews for Jesus

Dear Sandra,
I agree with much of what Byron said in his earlier
letter to you in this case. The issue for which I thought
we took the case, and which was fully briefed, was whether
the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding as a matter of
federal constitutional law that Los Angeles International
Airport was a "public forum" for purposes of First Amendment
doctrine. I had also thought that there were five votes at
Conference to say the Court of Appeals was wrong in this
part of its opinion.
I have some reservations about the approach which your
present opinion takes to resolving this case, although it
may be that after fuller consideration I would agree with
you. I had not read John's opinion in City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin's Castle, Inc. -- which I joined -- as broadly as
you have. I thought in that case we had simply required the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to tell us whether it
based its decision on state law or federal constitutional
law. It also seems clear to me that if the respondent here
were a state actor for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the
Court of Appeals could not grant relief on a state law basis
under Lewis' recent opinion in Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465
u.s. 89. I do not think either of these points is
dispositive against the conclusion that you reach, but they
make me reluctant to join your present draft without further
consideration and perhaps additional briefing and argument.
Sincerely,

Jnprtm.t ~DUrt &tf lJtt ~iltb Jtatt.e

~ulfinghm. '· ~. 21T.?'!~
CHAMBERS Of

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

April 13, 1987

Re:

No. 86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of the City
of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.

Dear Sandra:
We have never said that it is reversible error for a
federal court to fail to resolve a state-law issue before
reaching a federal constitutional claim, and I am not persuaded
that it is. There are countervailing policies here: the policy
of avoiding federal constitutional issues versus the policy of
avoiding pronouncements on state-law quest1ons. I am not willing
to say that giving preference to the latter is reversible error,
unless the dispositive nature of the state law is entirely clear.
Otherwise (since I know of no basis for imposing a "state-lawfirst" rule on state courts), we will have created the perverse
situation in which one is significantly more likely to obtain a
decision on a state question in federal court, and on a federal
question in state court. I would not regard the dispositive
nature of state law to be entirely clear if this Court feels it
necessary to remand rather than decide the state-law issue on its
merits. If an opinion can be written limiting the scope of the
new principle to "clearly dispositive state grounds," and
persuasively finding such grounds present in this case, I will
join.
Otherwise, while I share Bill's aversion to dicta, it
seems to me we should decide this case on the important point for
which we took it: public forum doctrine as applied to airports.
That can be done, without offending our new no-dicta rule, by
following Byron's suggestion that we reverse on the public forum
question and remand for the remainder, including both overbreadth and state law.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 13, 1987

Re:

86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of
the City of Los Angeles v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc.

Dear Sandra:
In my opinion it is perfectly clear that the
Board's blanket prohibition against "First Amendment
activities" is unconstitutional on its face
regardless of whether or not LAX is a public forum.
I could join a brief opinion affirming on that ground
without volunteering any opinion on the public forum
issue. As presently advised, however, I do not
believe I could join an opinion that reaches out to
engage in an unnecessary disquisition about either
public forums or public fora.
If you are going to lecture the Ninth Circuit
for bypassing the state law ground, I completely
agree with you that we should practice what we
preach--at least in the case in which we give the
sermon. Thus, I will join your opinion if your
proposed disposition receives the support of a
majority (including my vote).
Respectfully,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus
Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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•
T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

April 14, 1987

86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v.
,Jews for Jesus

Dear Sandra:
I would pref:er to decide the federal publi.c forum
question, as this is the issue on which we granted. It is
of interest 5n a number of states that have major airports.
I would not be inclined to dissent, however, if
there is a Court for your suggested d i.sposit ion.

Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
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The Conference
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BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER,
AKA A VI SNYDER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1987]

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court chooses to decide this case on a ground that was
neither briefed nor argued by the parties. It concludes that
a federal court exercising "federal question" jurisdiction and
presented with a substantial claim under the United States
Constitution must nonetheless decline to consider that claim
because plaintiff's claim under the California state constitution might prove dispositive. The Court thus extends substantially the established principle that a federal court must
resolve federal statutory claims before reaching federal constitutional claims.
The principles governing the jurisdiction and practice of
federal courts are presently and unhappily very complex, and
this decision bids fair to make them more so. Federal courts
are told to abstain from decision of federal questions when
difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved in order to reach a federal question. Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 236 (1984); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U. S. 496 (1941). But this sort of
abstention is invoked so that state courts may decide the difficult and unsettled questions of state law. Federal courts are
also admonished to abstain from deciding a federal question
presented to them in an area heavily regulated by local au-
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thorities, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), but
this abstention, too, is in the interest of obtaining a decision
from state authorities on questions of state law. See e. g.,
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U. S. 800, 814 (1976). Finally, federal courts
may not decide federal questions presented to them in a case
where a pending state proceeding is already underway, and
must actually dismiss the federal action. Ohio Civil Rights
Comission v. Dayton Christian Schools, - - U. S. - (1986); Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).
In another line of cases relating to pendent jurisdiction,
which is what is involved here, we have said that "needless
decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law."
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966). It
seems to me that the result the Court reaches today is likely
contrary to this part of Gibbs; federal courts are now told to
proceed and decide state law questions over which they have
only pendent jurisdiction before they may reach the federal
constitutional claim upon which the jurisdiction of the federal
court is based. Though the power of courts to proceed in this
way may be clear, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 213
U. S. 175, 193 (1909), a rule requiring this course of action is
an extreme example of the "non-federal tail.. wag[ging] the
federal dog." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, and H.
Wechsler, Hart & Wechler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 926 (2d ed. 1973).
The cases cited by the Court do not support the rule it announces today. Our decision in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283 (1982), did not admonish the
lower court for failing to decide state issues preliminary to
consideration of federal issues. Instead, the Court found itself unable to determine whether the decision under review
had in fact been one of state or federal law. Because a decision on the basis of state law would not have supported this

..
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Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2), we
remanded the case for clarification of the basis for the court's
decision. We did not suggest that it had to decide the case
on the basis of state law; instead we asked for a clear statement of whether its decision rested on state or federal law.
Nor is the Court's decision strengthened by its citation of
cases involving the Pullman abstention doctrine. Ante, at
6, citing Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) (per
curiam); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639 (1959)
(per curiam). The Court apparently views these cases as
establishing a general principle of "state law first." What it
ignores is the fact that this principle was applied so that unsettled questions of state law would be decided by the state
courts. Avoidance of constitutional issues in those cases,
therefore, was achieved without any interference of the federal judiciary into questions of state law. Here, by contrast,
the Court contemplates a resolution of state law by federal
courts; surely, different considerations apply.
I think it is unwise for the Court to erect still another rule
requiring federal courts to avoid the merits of federal constitutional claims without full briefing and argument by the
parties on that subject. I think the Court ought to reach the
merits of the federal constitutional issue decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case, but since
the Court chooses not to do so I refrain from expressing any
view on that question.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-104

BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER,
AKA A VI SNYDER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1987]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner Board of Airport Commissioners seeks
review of the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is a
"public forum" under the Federal Constitution. Because the
Court of Appeals failed to address respondents' parallel and
potentially dispositive claim under the California Constitution, we vacate the judgment below and remand for consideration of the state law claim.
I
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners
(Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides in
pertinent part:
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the
Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not
open for First Amendment activities by any individual
and/or entity;

"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effective date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or
entity seeks to engage in First Amendment activities
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within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be
deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy
of the Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to
the uses permitted within the Central Terminal Area at
Los Angeles International Airport; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any individual or
entity engages in First Amendment activities within the
Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litigation against such
individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this
Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commissioners .... " App. 4a-5a.
Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc. is a non-profit religious
corporation. On July 6, 1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a minister of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, was stopped by a Department of Airports peace officer while distributing free
religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central
Terminal Area at LAX. The officer showed Snyder a copy
of the resolution, explained that Snyder's activities violated
the resolution, and requested that Snyder leave LAX. The
officer warned Snyder that the City would take legal action
against him if he refused to leave as requested. App.
19a-20a. Snyder stopped distributing the leaflets and left
the airport terminal. App. 20a.
Jews for Jesus and Snyder then filed this action in the District Court for the Central District of California, challenging
the constitutionality of the resolution under both the California and Federal Constitutions. First, respondents contended that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under
Art. I, § 2 of the California Constitution and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it
bans all speech in a public forum. Second, they alleged that
the resolution had been applied to Jews for Jesus in a dis-
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criminatory manner. Finally, respondents urged that the
resolution is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
When the case came before the District Court for trial, the
parties orally stipulated to the facts, and the District Court
treated the trial briefs as cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held that the Central Terminal
Area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and
held that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under
the United States Constitution. The District Court declined
to reach the other issues raised by Jews for Jesus, and did
not address the constitutionality of the resolution under the
California Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 785 F. 2d 791 (1986). Relying on Rosen
v. Port of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981), and
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973),
the Court of Appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a
traditional public forum," 785 F. 2d, at 795, and held that
the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the Federal Constitution. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - (1986), and now vacate and remand.
II
In their complaint, Jews for Jesus alleged a violation of the
California Constitution as well as the Federal Constitution.
The Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution
provides:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." Cal. Canst., Art. I,
§ 2(a).

In recent years, the California courts have interpreted the
California Liberty of Speech Clause to provide greater protection for expressive activity than that provided by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P. 2d 116, 120

' , .. ,
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(1975) (The California Liberty of Speech Clause is "more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment"). Most notably, the California courts have adopted a view of "public
forum" under the Liberty of Speech Clause that is more expansive than that expressed by this Court in cases arising
under the First Amendment. Under the First Amendment,
this Court has stated that a public forum must be either a
"traditional" public forum such as a street or park that has by
long tradition been devoted to assembly or speech, or a "designated" public forum such as a municipal theater created by
government designation as a place of communication. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,-- U.S.
- - , - - (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The California Courts
have adopted a different approach. In In re Hoffman, 67
Cal. 2d 845, 434 P . 2d 353 (1967), the California Supreme
Court held that a railway terminal was a public forum because expressive activity was not inconsistent with the use of
the terminal:
"The primary uses of municipal property can amply be
protected by ordinances that prohibit activities that interfere with those uses. Similarly, the primary uses of
railway stations can be amply protected by ordinances
prohibiting activities that interfere with those uses. In
neither case can First Amendment activities be prohibited solely because the property involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for such activities.

"[I]n the present case, the test is not whether petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether it
interfered with that use." 67 Cal. 2d, at 850-851, 434 P.
2d, at 356.
Although In re Hoffman itself did not clearly indicate that
it rested on state law, the California courts have subsequently cited it as an aid to interpretation of the California
Constitution. Thus, in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Cen-
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ter, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P. 2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 447 U. S. 74
(1980), the California Supreme Court held that private shopping malls are public ·fora under the California Liberty of
Speech Clause, relying in part on In re Hoffman, supra, despite the fact that this Court had already held in Tanner v.
Lloyd Corp., Ltd., 407 U. S. 551 (1972), that the Federal
Constitution offered no such protection for expressive activities. See also Prisoners Union v. California Department of
Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1982)
(prison parking lot is public forum under California Constitution); University of California Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 154 Cal.
App. 3d 1157, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1984) (visitor center is a
public forum under California Constitution).
Under the California Liberty of Speech Clause, therefore,
the "public forum" doctrine "is not limited to traditional public forums such as streets, sidewalks, and parks or to sites
dedicated to communicative activity such as municipal theaters. Rather, the test under California law is whether the
communicative activity 'is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."'
Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F. 2d 1039, 1045 (CA9
1985), quoting Prisoners Union v. California Department of
Corrections, supra, at 939, 185 Cal. Rptr., at 639.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
described California's Liberty of Speech Clause as providing
"greater protection for expressive activity" than the First
Amendment, Carreras v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1044,
n. 7, nevertheless both the District Court and the Court of
Appeal failed to address respondents' claim that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under the California Constitution. Yet, under this Court's precedents federal courts
normally must address dispositive issues of state law before
considering claims under the Federal Constitution. In City
of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283 (1982),
this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals a constitutional
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challenge to a city ordinance governing coin-operated amusement establishments because the ordinance might violate the
Texas Constitution. We observed that "the language of the
Texas constitutional provision is different from, and arguably
significantly broader than, the language of the corresponding
federal provisions," id., at 293, and noted that "there is no
need for decision of the federal issue" if the state constitution
provided "independent support" for the plaintiff's requested
relief. I d., at 294-295. We concluded, consistent with this
Court's "policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of
federal constitutional issues," ibid., that under these circumstances the case must be remanded to determine whether the
case could be resolved under the Texas Constitution. Similarly, this Court has on several occasions remanded a case on
Pullman abstention grounds when the application of a state
constitutional provision might prevent the need to reach a
Federal Constitutional issue. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401
U. S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); City
of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639
(1959). Thus, as a result of these precedents, "[t]here exists
a growing recognition among Federal Courts of Appeals that
it is incumbent upon them to resolve issues of state constitutional law before reaching issues arising under the Federal Constitution." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, - - U. S.
- - , - - , Fl. 15 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit itself has done precisely that in applying the "public forum" principles of California constitutional law rather than the First Amendment to
invalidate a city ordinance banning solicitation at the Anaheim Stadium and Anaheim Convention Center. Carreras
v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1042-1043.
The principle that federal courts should avoid resting a decision on Federal Constitutional grounds if a case can be decided on the basis of state law follows from the more general
and longstanding principle that federal courts should avoid
unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional issues.

il
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See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S.
288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). As early as
1909, this Court recognized that federal courts should avoid
federal constitutional issues if a case can be decided on pendent state law grounds. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909); see also Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U. S. 528, 547 (1974) ("Numerous decisions of this Court
have stated the general proposition endorsed in Siler ....
These and other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the
federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where
not absolutely essential to disposition of a case"). "[l]f a controverted question of state law underlay the question of federal law, it [is] the district court's duty to decide the state
question first . . . in order to avoid if possible a federal
constitutional question." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro
& H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 989 (2d ed. 1973). State constitutional
provisions that do more than merely mirror Federal Constitutional guarantees offer no less compelling a ground for
decision than state statutes and case law. Cf. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 652-653 (1979) (observing that some
state constitutional provisions will be interpreted by state
courts to mirror Federal constitutional law). Particularly
when, as is the case here, the state constitution may provide
greater protection for individual rights than the United
States Constitution, the resolution of the federal claim may
be unnecessary to support the plaintiff's claim for relief. See
Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071,
1099-1100 (1974) ("When state law is truly clear and when
ruling on it would dispose of the case, it would seem appropriate for the federal court to rule on the state issue even
if the federal constitutional question is also clear and
nonsensitive").
In addition, principles of federalism compel the conclusion
that federal courts should first examine legitimate state con-

>I.
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stitutional claims, if their resolution is clear as a matter of
state law, before reaching any Federal Constitutional issues.
State constitutional law, no less than Federal Constitutional
law, has an important role to play in the protection of individual rights. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States' bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). But if state constitutional law is to play this role, the federal courts, no less than
the state courts, may be called upon to recognize and apply
settled state constitutional norms. In circumstances in
which the state law is neither clear nor dispositive, of course,
countervailing policies of federalism suggest that the federal
court should avoid "needless decisions of state law." United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966). But
where the applicable principle of state law is properly raised
as a pendent state claim, and the state law on the issue is
both entirely clear and completely dispositive of the case,
there is no cause for concern about federal "interference . . .
into questions of state law," post, at--, that would justify
departure from the "fundamental rule of judicial restraint"
that federal courts should avoid unnecessary adjudication of
federal constitutional issues. Three Affiliated Tribes of
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U. S. 138,
157 (1984).
In this case several factors strongly counsel in favor of first
addressing the respondents' pendent state claim before
reaching the Federal Constitutional issues. Respondents
raised the state law issue in the courts below, and in this
Court they discussed the applicability of the California Constitution to this case, noted that the state constitutional issue
had been extensively briefed and argued below, and observed
that "[t]he corollary to the general principle that decision of
federal constitutional questions should be avoided when possible . . . applies equally when the pendent state ground is
the state constitution rather than a statute." Brief for Re-
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spondents 21, n. 32. Moreover, when a rule of judicial restraint and prudence is at issue, this Court is not necessarily
limited by the issues raised by the parties in this Court. Indeed, in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U. S. 496 (1941),
prudential considerations led this Court to apply an abstention doctrine that was neither briefed nor argued by the parties. Respondents' claim under the California Constitution
is potentially dispositive, and is based on a state constitutional provision that does not merely mirror the Federal Constitution. The California Courts have given the concept of
"public forum" a settled meaning under the California Constitution that offers broader protection to expressive activity
in public facilities than that under the First Amendment.
There exists "[n]o reason for hasty decision of the [federal]
constitutional question presented by this case." City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., supra, at 294. Because the
District Court and the Court of Appeals simply ignored respondents' claim under the California Liberty of Speech
Clause, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
Even if the Court of Appeals, as a prudential matter,
should have decided the case on State-law grounds, it did not,
and the Federal issue has been briefed and argued here in
this Court. In these circumstances, we should not waste the
effort we have expended on this case. The Federal issue
should be addressed, as THE CHIEF JuSTICE suggests.

/

~--~
..hprmtt <!fourl 4tf tq~ ~~ .Blatt•
.u!tiqt~ !J. Of. 20~Jl.~
CHAMBERS OF
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..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 86-104, Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus
Dear Sandra:
This case, as for most of the rest of us, has given me difficulty.
After reading the proposed opinions and the correspondence~ my
preference now is to dec'
the case on overbreadth. This means that
I do not join your op1nion as prese
r1
I would hope that
the case could be decided on overbreadth without getting into the
entanglements of the public forum issue.
I am not sure, from the
correspondence, that there is a Court for the public forum issue
anyway.
Sincerely,

..

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference
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.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 11, 1987

Re:

86-104

Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews
for Jesus

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Now that Harry has indicated he will not be
joining my circulating opinion in this case I will go
back to the drawing board and address the public forum
and overbreadth issues.
It may take a couple of
weeks.
Sincerely,
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 14, 1987

Re:

86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of
the City of Los Angeles v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc.

Dear Sandra:
Since the overbreadth issue is clearly
dispositive in this case, I see no need to address
the public forum question.
Respectfully,
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Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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No. 86-104

BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER,
AKA AVI SNYDER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1987]

JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented in this case is whether a resolution
banning_@ "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violates the First Amendment.
I

On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners
(Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides in
pertinent part:
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the
Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not
open for First Amendment activities by any individual
and/or entity;
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effective date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or
entity seeks to engage in First Amendment activities
within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be
deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy
of the Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to
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the uses permitted within the Central Terminal Area at
Los Angeles International Airport; and
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any individual
or entity engages in First Amendment activities within
the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International
Airport, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is
directed to institute appropriate litigation against such
individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this
Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commissioners .
. . . " App. 4a-5a.
Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc. is a nonprofit religious
corporation. On July 6, 1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a minister of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, was stopped by a Department of Airports peace officer while distributing free
religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central
Term1na1 A.~"'eofficer showed Snyder a copy
of the resolution, explained that Snyder's activities violated
the resolution, and requested that Snyder leave LAX. The
officer warned Snyder that J.he Cit~ would take legal action
agamst1iliiilr he refused to leave as requested. 1 d., at
19a-20a. Snyder stopped distributing the leaflets and left
the airport terminal. I d., at 20a.
Jews for Jesus and Snyder then filed this action in the District Court for the Central District of California, challenging
the constitutionality of the resolution under both the California and Federal Constitutions. ~' respondents contended that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under
Art. I, § 2 of the California Constitution and the First
Amendment to the United States ~itution because it
bans all ..speech in a Jl.Ublic forum. Seeemf. they alleged that
th~esolution had bee~d to Jews for Jesus in a discriminatory manner. ~ re_§Qondents urged that the
resolution was unconstitutiOnally vague and overbroad.
When the case came before the District C"ourtror trial, the
parties orally stipulated to the facts, and the District Court
treated the trial briefs as cross-motions for summary judg-
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ment. The District Court held that the Central Terminal
Area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and
held that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under
the United States Constitution. The District Court declined
to reach the other issues raised by Jews for Jesus, and did
not address the constitutionality of the resolution under the
California Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 785 F. 2d 791 (1986). Relying on Rosen
v. Port of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981), and
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973),
the Court of Appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a
traditional public forum," 785 F. 2d, at 795, and held that the
resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the Federal
Constitution. We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1986),
and now affirm, but on different grounds.
------,
II

In balancing the government's interest in limiting the use
of its property against the interests of those who wish to use
the property for expressive activity, the Cou~'!!'tified
three types of for~onal public fo
e public
forum create"d by government designation, and
onpublic
forum. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.,
460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The proper First Amendment
analysis differs depending on whether the area in question
falls in one category rather than another. In a traditional
public forum or a public forum by government designation,
we have held that First Amendment protections are subject
to Qeightened ...8.G!_utiny:
"In these quintessential public f6rums, the government
may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the
State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. . . . The State may also enforce regulations of
the time, place, and manner of expression which are con-
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tent-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication." I d., at 45.
We have further held, however, that access to a nonpublic
forum may be restricted by government regulation as long as
the regulation "is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because officials oppose the speaker's view."
Id., at 46.
The petitioners contend that LAX is neither a traditional
public forum nor a public forum by government desi~ation,
and accordingly argue that the latter standard governing access to a nonpublic forum is appropriate. The respondents,
in turn, argue that LAX is a public forum subject only to reasonable time, place or manner restrictions. Moreover, at
least one commentator contends that Perry does not control a
case such as this in which the respondents already have access to the .airport, and therefore concludes that this case is
analogous to Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S.
503 (1969). See Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private
Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 48 (1986). Because we conclude that the resolution is facially unconstitutional under the
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine regardless of the
proper standard, we need not decide whether LAX is indeed
a public forum, or whether the Perry standard is applicable
when access to a nonpublic forum is not restricted.
Under the First Amendment o~d.Q§rine, an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is
permitted to challenge a statute on its face "because it also
threatens others~those who desire to
engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain
from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to
have the law declared partially invalid." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 503 (1985). A statute
may be invalidated on its e~ly if the overbreadth is "substantial." Houston v. Hill,-- U. S. - - ,

..

il
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(1987); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769 (1982);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973). Therequirement that the overbreadth be substantial arose from our
recognition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is,
"manifestly, strong medicine," Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
supra, at 613, and that "there must be a realistic danger that
the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized
First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court
for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds."
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801
(1984).
On its face, the resolution at issue in this case reaches the
1
" universe of expressive activity, and,
y pro ~all prot e c t e - o create a virtual "First Amendment Free Zone" at LAX. The resolution does not merely
regulate expressive activity in the Central Terminal Area
that might create problems such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of those who use LAX. Instead, the
resolution expansively states that LAX "is not open for First
Amen men ac iv1 ies by any inaividual anaTorentity," and
that ny 1 1vi al an or entity [w o] see s o engage in
First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal
Area ... shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the
stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners." App.
4a-5a. The resolution therefore does not merely J:.Qaek mass
~iGHs and--leaflQtting at LAX; it prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing. Under such a sweeping ban, virtually every
individual who enters LAX may be found to violate the resolution by engaging in some "First Amendment activit[y]."
We think it obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if
LAX were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable govern, •. ~, /.J...
me~stify such an absolute prohibition of
. .J ,
~
speech.
~ ,
Additionally, we find no a rent s ing construction of
~f ~J,t<--- the resolution. The resolution expressly applies to all irst

-o

y

·

~~ ~tpf<tJV- ~ .J#,I ~

;;:::

~'r.~

~
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Amendment activities," and the words of the resolution simply leave no room for a narrowing construction. In the past
the Court sometimes has used either abstention or certification when, as here, the state courts have not had the opportunity to give the statute under challenge a definite construction. See, e. g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National
Union, 442 U. S. 289 (1979). Neither option, however, is
appropriate in this case because California has no certificatiotL,proc~dure, and the resolution is~ tO an
interpretation which Woilla rendef"'unnecessaryorsubstantiall modify t e e era constitutional question." Harmon
v. Fors~8, 535 1965). The difficulties in
adopting a limiting construction of the resolution are not unlike those found in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964).
At issue in Baggett was the constitutionality of several statutes requiring loyalty oaths. The Baggett Court concluded
that abstention would serve no purpose given the lack of any
limiting construction, and held the statutes unconstitutional
on their face under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. We observed that the challenged loyalty oath was not
"open to one or a few interpretations, but to an indefinite
number," and concluded that "[i]t is fictional to believe that
anything less than extensive adjudications, under the impact
of a variety of factual situations, would bring the oath within
the bounds of permissible constitutional certainty." I d., at
378. Here too, it is difficult to imagine that the resolution
could be limited by anything less than a series of adjudications, and the chilling effect of the resolution on protected
speech in the meantime would make such a case-by-case adjudication intolerable.
The petitioners suggest that the resolution is not substantially overbroad because it is intended to reach only expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes. Such a
limiting construction, however, is of little assistance in substantially reducing the overbreadth of the resolution. Much
nondisruptive speech-such as the wearing of a T-Shirt or

~.

,.

~
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button that contains a political message-may not be "airport
related," but is still protected speech even in a nonpublic
forum. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971).
Moreover, the vagueness of this suggested construction itself
presents serious constitutional difficulty. The line between
airport-related speech and nonairport-related speech is, at
best, murky. The petitioners, for example, suggest that an
individual who reads a newspaper or converses with a neighbor at LAX is engaged in permitted "airport-related" activity
because reading or conversing permits the traveling public to
"pass the time." Reply Brief for Petitioners 12. We presume, however, that petitioners would not so categorize the
activities of a member of a religious or political organization
who decides to "pass the time" by distributing leaflets to fellow travelers. In essence, the result of this vague limiting
construction would be to give LAX officials alone the power
to decide in the first instance whether a given activity is airport related. Such a law that "confers on police a virtually
unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation" of the resolution is unconstitutional because "[t]he
opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually o en-ended interpretation, is self-evident."
Lewis v. C · o ew Or
s, 415 U. S. 130, 135-136 (1974);
see a
ouston v. Hill,
U. S., at--; Kolender v.
Laws , 461 U. S. 352, 3 (1983).
We cone
resolution is substantially overbroad,
and is not fairly subject to a limiting construction. Accordingly, we hold that the resolution violates the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

May 27, 1987

Leslie

No. 86-104, Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus
Justice

O'Connor's

draft

opinion

for

the

Court

is

now

l(

circulating in this

case.

She has

resolved the

case on over-

___...., \~

breadth, rather than reaching the public forum issue.
lution appears fine to me,

,(

l

but then resolution on the state law

ground appeared fine to me as well.
alternate ground for

This reso-

' " th~

~ ng

The overbreadth issue is an
jud ~ent

b~ low,

r

whereas if the
.

Court reached the public forum issue, it would reverse the judgment.

You indicated in your memo to Justice O'Connor that you

thought the public forum issue should be addressed.
request
forum

that

issue

Justice
and

O'Connor

first

then affirm the

could

lower

court

address

You could
the

public

judgment based on

J

~

overbreadth.

This, however, would seem at odds with the Court's

'
policy of not reaching unnecessary constit~tional is$ues.

Aneth-

er consideration is that the Court is split on whether the public
forum issue need be addressed.
wait

to

address

the

public

believe that the issue is
that

It may be better for the Court to

forum

issue

until

all

the

In sum,

prope~ly

onnor's resolution is

Justices
I believe

If you think

that the need to address the public forum issue is of overriding
importance,

however,

you may want

to defer

joining the opinion

until it is evident how many other Justices share your view.

j;lt.Jlrttttt <qcurt ttf tqt ~ittb ,jtatt~
Jht,glfingtttn, ~. <q. 2ll&t'!~
CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 27, 1987

Re:

86-104

Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am circulating herewith a revised approach
in this case. The Court is divided on the
desirability of resolving the public forum issue.
Having "tinkered" with several versions, I have
decided there is no nee
esolve
e
bli
orum
question in light
the ove~rlth b~lding.
Accordingly, the~w draft proposes affirming on
overbreadth.
Sincerely,

.

,,

'..·.

):,r; ..~·-.i',

(

.

,•,

'

~upumt

Qf4tltrl .o:f tlrt ~nitn ~hrlt.
J[rurJringt.o:n. ~. elf. 21lp'!~

I

/
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 27, 1987

Re:

86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of
the City of Los Angeles v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc.

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

'

.

I

j}uprmtt Qfttlttt of tfrt ~b jlhttt•
~ulfiughtn. ~.

<lf.

2Ll~'l-~

CHAMI!IERS 01'"

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN , JR .

May 28, 1987

Re:

No. 86-104 Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus

Dear Sandra
Please join me.
Sincerely,
I

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

~u:.prtm.t Qicu.rt of t4t ~b ~tatte

11taefringtcn. ~. Qt.

2ll&f~;t

CHAMBE:RS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

/

May 29, 1987

Re:

No. 86-104-Bd. of Airport Commissioners of the
City of LA v. Jews For Jesus
Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your latest draft (5/27/87).
Sincerely,
~·
T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

May 29, 1987

86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v.
Jews for Jesus

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

cc:

The Conference

,.

..,

May 29, 1987

86-104 Board of Airport C'..ommiss toners
Jews for Jesus

near Sandra:
Although I have ioined your Court opinion in this case,
I would appreciate your taking a look at the sentence in the
first full paragraph of paqe 5 that begins: "The resolution
therefore does not merely reach mass demonstrations and
leafletting at LAX 1 ••• "
I would prefer saying that the resolutj.on "0oes not
reach merely the activity of respondents at LAY.; ••• " ~he
sentence as it now reads mav suggest an unduly narrow scone
of permiss i ble regulation in a nonpublic forum.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

~u;trtmt <!ltt1trl

oJ tlrt ~tb ~taft.&'

Jlagftinghtn. ~. <!l·

2lJp~~

CH AMBE RS OF

June 1,

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of
the City of Los Angeles v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc.

Dear Sandra,
I

join

your

opinion

but

word or two on the side.
Sincerely yours,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

will

write

a

~n.vrttttt

Cltlmrt o-f tqt 'Jnitta ~tatt.s'

~a$ftington, ~.

ar. 2.0.;i~~ '

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 1, 1987

No. 86-104

Bd. of Airport Commrs. v.
Jews for Jesus

Dear Lewis,
I have incorporated your suggested change
in a new draft which will circulate today.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

..iu.prtntt Clfltltri gf t!rt ~b ..itatt.e
~a.e!fittghtn. ~.

<fl.

20~~~

CHAMI!IERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 2, 1987

Re:

86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners v.
Jews for Jesus

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

;iupttutt

arourl of tqt ~b .jtzdts

Jfaslfinghtn. ~. <!f.

2ll~~~

CHAMI!IERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 2, 1987

Re:

86....:104 - Board of Airport Commissioners v.
Jews for Jesus

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

.

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

v~

.tupr.tm~

QI&mrt Df tJrt ~ittb .ttatt•
)lulfbtgton. J. QI. 2D?~'

CHAMBERS

0~

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

June 3, 1987

Re:

No.86-104 - Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus

Dear Sandra:
I would be pleased to join your opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

ju.prtm.e atourt of t~t ~iitb ..it'ltt.s
Jla.tYftiugton. ~. Of. 21lbi~~ ·
CHAMBE:RS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 4, 1987

No. 86-104

Bd. of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus

Dear Chief,
This case was scheduled to come down next week, but it
contains references to Houston v. Hill, No. 86-243.
I would
prefer to leave the citations and postpone announcing this case
until Houston v. Hill is ready for announcement.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference
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